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THE PRAGMATIC POPULISM OF JUSTICE
STEVENS’S FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
Gregory P. Magarian*
If any single word can describe Justice John Paul Stevens’s approach to
judicial decision making, the word is “pragmatic.” Justice Stevens’s
opinions routinely display the hallmarks of pragmatic reasoning.
Methodologically, he resists abstract, “one size fits all” legal rules and
standards, pays close attention to the facts and contexts of particular cases,
and favors limited resolutions that address only the questions squarely
presented. “[H]is emphasis is on how rules work”1 rather than on enforcing
formal abstractions or advancing normative ends. One thorough study of
Justice Stevens’s early Supreme Court years ascribes to his work “the
consistency of pragmatic method and concern for clarity, rather than of
conservatism or liberalism.”2 The Justice’s pragmatism has achieved
special prominence in his opinions about expressive freedom under the First
Amendment. His free speech opinions aim “to distinguish communications
of greater and lesser value and to weigh each against the public interest in
constraint, which varies according to context.”3 Pragmatism has led Justice
Stevens to nuanced, practically grounded reasoning in an area that can lend
itself all too easily to reflexive, normatively charged outcomes.
Justice Stevens takes a distinctive approach to the First Amendment, an
approach this Article calls “pragmatic populism.” During the Justice’s
three decades on the Supreme Court, majority decisions have crystallized a
theory of First Amendment speech protection as an abstract, negative
protection of individual autonomy against government interference. Justice
Stevens’s pragmatism, in contrast, causes him to place greater emphasis on
free speech decisions’ practical consequences for collective decision
* Professor of Law, Villanova University. Thanks to Mike Carroll, Steve Chanenson, and
Tiffany Graham for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Robert Judd Sickels, John Paul Stevens and the Constitution: The Search for
Balance 154 (1988).
2. Id. at 1; see also Norman Dorsen, John Paul Stevens, 1992/1993 Ann. Surv. Am. L.,
at xxvi (“He is a pragmatist—cautious, realistic, practical.”). Using different terms,
Frederick Schauer associates Justice Stevens with “the Legal Realist claim that the power of
the particular always or usually dominates the power of the general.” Frederick Schauer,
Justice Stevens and the Size of Constitutional Decisions, 27 Rutgers L.J. 543, 544 (1996).
William Popkin casts Justice Stevens as “a common law lawyer adapting his views to
modern conditions.” William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The
Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 Duke L.J. 1087, 1090.
3. Sickels, supra note 1, at 65.
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making about matters of public concern. In his view, the First Amendment
must operate to make democratic discourse inclusive as to both participants
and subject matter in order to ensure robust, well-informed public debate.
This substantively pragmatic approach to free speech controversies, filtered
through a pragmatic judicial methodology, has led Justice Stevens to a
populist4 focus on disparities in social power that can exclude economically
and politically marginal speakers from public debate.
This Article demonstrates how the combination of methodological and
substantive pragmatism that Justice Stevens brings to First Amendment
cases has produced his distinctively populist free speech jurisprudence.
Part I draws an outline of Justice Stevens’s pragmatic populism. The first
section describes the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ dominant, autonomyfocused conception of expressive freedom as a negative right against
government regulation.
The Court’s negative First Amendment
jurisprudence attaches no special importance to the goal of fostering robust
democratic discourse, and it therefore pays no special attention to the
differences in economic and political power that characterize many free
speech controversies. The second section of Part I explains how Justice
Stevens’s pragmatism, both in his substantive focus on the consequences of
free speech decisions and in his practically grounded approach to judicial
decision making, forms the basis for his populist challenge to the Court’s
negative First Amendment doctrine.
Part II examines the distinctive ways in which Justice Stevens’s
pragmatic populism advances expressive freedom. The first section
demonstrates Justice Stevens’s singular commitment to protecting means of
expression especially important to underfinanced speakers. The second
section focuses on his efforts to ensure that the political process includes
many and varied perspectives, fostering broad-based debate about critical
public issues. Part III addresses recent academic critics of Justice Stevens
who charge that his First Amendment opinions reflect a politically liberal
bias. Refuting those charges, the discussion explains how Justice Stevens’s
nuanced responses to First Amendment claims in two important areas—
speech that assaults marginalized groups and persons, and commercial
advertising—serve his pragmatic concern with the social power dynamics
that affect public debate.

4. By populist, I mean a legal doctrine that employs the First Amendment to prevent
entrenched distributions of economic and political power from limiting the inclusion of
speakers and ideas in public discourse, in order to foster vigorous debate in the service of a
healthy democratic system. I take this sense of populism—emphasizing broad-based
participation in public decision making, openness to dissent, and an overarching aspiration
toward participatory democracy—from Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment: A Short
History of the Agrarian Revolt in America (1978). For an interesting discussion of
populism’s implications for expressive freedom, see J.M. Balkin, Populism and
Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 Yale L.J. 1935 (1995) (book review).
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I. THE CONTEXT AND UNDERPINNINGS OF JUSTICE STEVENS’S PRAGMATIC
POPULIST APPROACH TO EXPRESSIVE FREEDOM
A. The Negative First Amendment of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
The development of First Amendment free speech doctrine in the early
twentieth century focused on government efforts to silence speakers of
modest means who held highly unpopular political views.5 The famous
opinions of Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis in those
early cases developed the position that expressive freedom serves the need
in a democratic society for open, robust discussion of controversial issues,
in part by protecting marginal voices that bring distinctive perspectives to
public discourse. As Justice Brandeis wrote in Whitney v. California,6
“Those who won our independence believed . . . that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth; . . . that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; [and] that public discussion is a political duty.”7 During the
Warren Court era, a majority of the Justices embraced the Holmes-Brandeis
approach to expressive freedom as constitutional doctrine. In numerous
decisions, of which the most eloquent and influential were New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan8 and Cohen v. California,9 the Court aggressively vindicated
economically and politically marginal speakers’ important role in
expanding debates about matters of societal concern. Justice John Harlan,
the great skeptic of the Warren Court’s rights revolution, declared in Cohen,
“The constitutional right of free expression . . . is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion . . . in
the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity.”10
Over the past thirty-five years, however, the Court has dramatically
shifted its focus in free speech cases. In a trend that gradually developed
under Chief Justice Warren Burger and took firm hold under Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, the Court has treated expressive freedom not as a
means to the end of inclusive democratic discourse but rather as a negative
right that shields individual autonomy against government interference.11
5. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
6. 274 U.S. at 375.
7. Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (overturning a libel verdict against civil rights leaders based on
the need to prevent potential liability from undermining political debate).
9. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning the conviction of Vietnam War opponent for
displaying the slogan “Fuck the Draft” on his jacket while walking through a courthouse).
10. Id. at 24.
11. I have called this predominant notion of free speech the “private rights theory” of
expressive freedom. The description in this paragraph draws upon an earlier, more
systematic discussion in Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public
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Because this negative approach to expressive freedom views individual
autonomy as the object of constitutional free speech protection, it entails no
special attention to the instrumental benefits of free speech for democratic
discourse. Speech that advances public debate has no greater constitutional
value than any other category of speech.12 As long as individuals—
prominently including the often-powerful institutions that the law generally
treats as rights-bearing individuals13—can use the expressive capacity they
possess to say what they want to say, the First Amendment is doing its job.
The Court, in following this negative approach to expressive freedom,
allows little room for government efforts to regulate in ways that
redistribute or expand expressive opportunities. The Court does, however,
balance free speech claims against countervailing government regulatory
interests, such as the interests in preserving public order and governmental
efficiency.
Viewing all free speech claims as formally equal while restricting
government efforts to distribute expressive opportunities has an important
practical consequence: The First Amendment does much more for rich and
politically powerful speakers than for poor and politically marginal
speakers.14 Economic or political power allows those who possess it to
create expressive opportunities, while negative free speech doctrine
presumptively bars government from regulating those opportunities.15 In
contrast, economically and politically marginal people and groups, who
often lack the capacity to create expressive opportunities, frequently need
affirmative government aid. Government efforts to create expressive
opportunities for marginal speakers may require redistribution of more
powerful speakers’ expressive opportunities.
The Court’s negative
approach to the First Amendment privileges autonomously generated
expressive opportunities and disdains government regulation of speech. A
few familiar examples illustrate how the Court has invoked the First
Amendment to assist the expressive activity of socially powerful speakers
while ignoring or compromising the expressive interests of both
underfinanced speakers and political dissenters.

Rights” First Amendment, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1939, 1947-59 (2003) (describing
characteristics of private rights theory).
12. For further discussion of the Court’s recent failures to show any special concern for
political expression, see Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of
Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 247, 251-52 (2005).
13. See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (introducing the
concept of the “corporate person” to U.S. law).
14. Numerous commentators, at various stages during the Burger and Rehnquist years,
have critiqued the Court’s reinforcement of existing distributions of expressive
opportunities. Important examples include J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:
Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375; Owen M. Fiss, Free
Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech
Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1992).
15. See Magarian, supra note 11, at 1957-58 (describing the Court’s distaste for
government regulation to redistribute expressive opportunities).
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The negative First Amendment reinforces economic disparities in the
distribution of expressive opportunities. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,16 the Court curbed the effect of the Warren Court’s decision in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,17 which had authorized substantial
government regulation of communications media in order to expand access
to the means of public debate. Miami Herald buttressed the Court’s
decision in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee,18 which dismissed the possibility that the First Amendment
might mandate access to expressive opportunities. In Hudgens v. NLRB,19
the Court overruled another Warren Court decision, Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 540 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,20 to hold that
private shopping centers did not have to tolerate expressive activity. A
series of decisions in the 1980s limited the public’s access to government
property useful for expression, either by imposing a cramped definition of
what constituted a “public forum”21 or by credulously defining the class of
“time, place, or manner” regulations that justify limitations on speech in
nonpublic forums.22 Taken together, these decisions make private property
a predicate for participation in public discourse. One who owns property
may freely use it to speak or to prevent others from speaking. The fact that
ownership may depend on governmentally conferred advantages—
permission to build a shopping center, or granting of a broadcast license—
does not justify redistributive regulation. At the same time, the government
has no affirmative obligation to make its own expressive resources
available to underfinanced speakers.
The negative approach to expressive freedom, applied to free speech
disputes about the electoral process, also reinforces existing allocations of
political power. The most important and prominent example is Buckley v.
Valeo,23 in which the Court, equating money with speech,24 blocked
governmental efforts to limit expenditures in political campaigns. The
Buckley Court upheld restrictions on campaign contributions as a means of
preventing actual or perceived corruption of government.25 In contrast, the
16. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down a state statute that required news outlets to
provide rights of reply to subjects of published criticisms).
17. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
18. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
19. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
20. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(denying political groups access to a federal employee charity drive).
22. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
(upholding the expulsion of advocates for homeless from a park adjacent to the White
House).
23. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). For further discussion of campaign finance
regulation, see infra notes 167-83 and accompanying text.
24. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. (“[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence
of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech
element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.” (citations
omitted)).
25. See id. at 24-29.
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Court rejected as a justification for regulating campaign expenditures the
government’s asserted “interest in equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.”26 Ignoring
the danger that wealthy and powerful interests might consolidate control
over the political process, the Court dismissed this “equalization rationale”
as a patently impermissible attempt to “restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others,” which the
Court termed “wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”27 The Buckley
Court, at first glance, appears to have transcended a negative approach to
expressive freedom by recognizing the special importance of political
speech and the necessity of robust, unlimited political debate.28 The
majority, however, treated campaign spending as an undifferentiated
category of autonomous speech that government regulation could only
impede. The Court showed no regard for the substantive discrepancies in
economic and political power that affect political campaigns. Rejection of
the “equalization rationale” has allowed holders of political power to
entrench their dominance in our political system.
The Court’s negative approach to expressive freedom, in both its
economic and political dimensions, undergirds many other central
developments in First Amendment doctrine over the past three decades:
unprecedented judicial attention to financial remuneration for speech as an
object of First Amendment concern;29 a decisive preference for First
Amendment autonomy claims of the major political parties over First
Amendment access claims of minor political parties;30 and the creation and
increasing prominence of First Amendment protection for commercial
advertising.31 All of these doctrines reflect the Court’s increasingly rigid
commitment to a First Amendment that protects individuals’ expressive
autonomy from government regulation without regard to the social position
of the speaker, the nature and purpose of the speech, or the consequences of
the Court’s decision for democratic discourse.

26. Id. at 48.
27. Id. at 48-49.
28. See id. at 14-15 (asserting the central importance of electoral speech under the First
Amendment).
29. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105 (1991). For further discussion of restrictions on financial remuneration for speech,
see infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (rejecting a
First Amendment challenge to the state’s ban on minor parties’ use of fusion candidacies).
For further discussion of minor parties’ First Amendment claims, see infra notes 133-59 and
accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (striking down a state ban on price advertising by pharmacists and announcing
the doctrine of First Amendment protection for commercial speech). For further discussion
of commercial speech, see infra notes 243-68 and accompanying text.
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B. Justice Stevens: From Pragmatism to Populism
Justice Stevens joined the Supreme Court in 1976, just as the majority
was beginning to solidify its negative view of expressive freedom. Justice
Stevens immediately displayed a very different approach to the First
Amendment. Rejecting the theory that the Free Speech Clause merely
affords individual autonomy a negative protection against government
regulation, he approaches free speech controversies with acute attention to
their underlying facts and likely practical consequences. Rather than
understanding the First Amendment as an indifferent shield against
government action, he understands it as a positive means toward a robust,
inclusive democratic discourse. Thus, instead of deciding First Amendment
cases in a manner that elevates the strong and denigrates the weak, he has
articulated a First Amendment jurisprudence that strives to prevent
established differences in political and economic power from perpetuating
themselves by permeating democratic discourse.
1. Substantive and Methodological First Amendment Pragmatism
Justice Stevens’s free speech jurisprudence provides a counterpoint to the
Court’s disregard for the differences in economic and political power
integral to many free speech controversies. From the Justice’s earliest years
on the Court, two pragmatic premises—one substantive and the other
methodological—have driven his analysis in First Amendment cases.
First, because pragmatism looks toward the actual consequences of
decisions, Justice Stevens’s pragmatism dictates the substantive view that a
central purpose of constitutional speech protection is to allow our selfgoverning polity to engage in informed debate about issues of public
concern.32 Although he takes care not to limit the First Amendment to
explicitly political expression, explaining that the Framers “used words that
identify and express a faith in principles of tolerance and resistance to
authority that bespeak a broader concept of liberty,”33 his consistent
emphasis on resistance to official orthodoxy34 reflects a purposive, socially
32. John Dewey’s account of free speech provides an interesting antecedent to Justice
Stevens’s approach. Dewey, while recognizing the importance of speech for personal
flourishing, emphasized the value of expressive freedom for a democratic system, stating
that “whatever interferes with the free circulation of knowledge and opinions is adverse to
the efficient working of democratic institutions.” John Dewey & James H. Tufts, Ethics 399
(rev. ed. 1932). He also identified “those who are already entrenched in power, economic
and political” as the source of danger to freedom. Id. at 401-02. Accordingly, he recognized
the special importance for democracy of political dissenters: “[G]enuine democracy will
always secure to every individual a maximum of liberty of expression and will establish the
conditions which will enable the minority by use of communication and persuasion to
become a majority.” Id. at 404.
33. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 Yale L.J. 1293, 1297 (1993).
34. “[W]hen Justice Jackson referred to the ‘freedom to be intellectually and spiritually
diverse’ in the second flag salute case, he was construing the central meaning of the entire
[First] Amendment.” Id. (quoting West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641
(1943)).
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grounded conception of expressive freedom. In an early dissent from a
decision upholding a county jail’s restriction on press access, Justice
Stevens declares, “The preservation of a full and free flow of information to
the general public has long been recognized as a core objective of the First
Amendment.”35 He ties this informational value directly to democratic
debate, explaining that if government were allowed to operate beyond
public view, “the process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers
would be stripped of its substance.”36
Justice Stevens’s focus on the consequences of free speech decisions,
rather than their formal adherence to some libertarian abstraction, leads him
to accept some government regulations that affect speech. Thus, in an
opinion that acknowledges “[t]he essential concern embodied in the First
Amendment is that government not impose its viewpoint on the public or
select the topics on which public debate is permissible,”37 he can also state,
“Just as the regulation of an economic market may either enhance or curtail
the free exchange of goods and services, so may regulation of the
communications market sometimes facilitate and sometimes inhibit the
exchange of information, ideas, and impressions.”38 Justice Stevens’s
recent majority opinion in Bartnicki v. Vopper,39 which reversed a tort
verdict against media outlets that acquired and published accounts of a
private discussion between principal figures in a labor dispute, reiterates
this special First Amendment solicitude for informed public debate. The
opinion holds that “privacy concerns give way when balanced against the
interest in publishing matters of public importance,”40 calling that sacrifice
of privacy “[o]ne of the costs associated with participation in public
affairs.”41 This substantively pragmatic view of expressive freedom as a
means to democratic ends contrasts sharply with the Court’s tendency to
view the Speech Clause as an abstract guarantee of expressive autonomy—a
35. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983) (referring to robust debate on public
issues as “the primary value[] protected by the First Amendment”).
36. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 32 (footnote omitted).
37. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part).
38. Id. at 548 (footnote omitted). I believe Justice Stevens’s substantive First
Amendment pragmatism provides the most useful framework for understanding his
statements, more prominent in his early years on the Court, about disparities in value among
different kinds of speech. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (arguing that “patently offensive references to excretory and sexual
organs and activities. . . . surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern” (footnote
and citations omitted)). His more recent acknowledgements of the value of some sexually
explicit speech may reflect a pragmatic reassessment. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 877 (1997) (“The general, undefined terms ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ cover
large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value.”
(footnote omitted)).
39. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
40. Id. at 534.
41. Id.; see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797 (2002) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (contending that the First Amendment should not protect certain statements in
state judicial elections because of the consequences for judicial integrity).
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conspicuously scarce tendency in Justice Stevens’s First Amendment
opinions.
Justice Stevens’s First Amendment jurisprudence also reflects a second
pragmatic dimension. Because pragmatism directs attention to the
particular circumstances in which a legal problem arises, the Justice
resolves cases through a pragmatic methodology, which focuses on the
practical implications of judicial decisions. He stresses the specific facts of
each case and avoids announcing rules that might govern future situations
in which distinct circumstances could require different legal approaches.42
Thus, in the First Amendment context, he advocates “supplementing, if not
replacing, the black-letter rule with a sensitivity to fact and context that
allows for advancement of the principles underlying the protection of free
speech.”43 He contends that accumulated observation provides a better
guide through the free speech thicket than generic categories of expression
and regulation. “My experience on the bench,” he writes, “has convinced
me that these categories must be used with caution and viewed with
skepticism.”44 Justice Stevens criticizes black-letter approaches to free
speech disputes as “often produc[ing] unworkable and unsatisfactory
Most significantly, he resists the Court’s categorical
results.”45
presumption that content-based speech regulations violate expressive
freedom.46 Justice Stevens’s Bartnicki opinion once again provides a recent
illustration of his pragmatism at work. In assessing the constitutionality of
publishing an illegally intercepted conversation, Justice Stevens takes pains
to emphasize that the issue arises only “as applied to the specific facts of
these cases”47 and to limit the legal issue to the peculiar pattern of unlawful
interception followed by lawful transmission.48
These two varieties of First Amendment pragmatism—substantive and
methodological—prompt Justice Stevens to ask questions in free speech
cases that his colleagues do not consider. Where does the speaker at issue
42. See Sickels, supra note 1, at 5 (“It is a constant theme in Stevens’s judicial opinions:
the best decisions are likely to be made by trial judges equipped with well-crafted rules . . .
and the discretion to fit them intelligently to the facts of each case and to the wider needs of
the legal system.”); Popkin, supra note 2, at 1096 (imputing to Justice Stevens the belief that
“courts should deliberate carefully about the facts of the case, avoiding both overly broad
generalizations and summary dispositions”); Schauer, supra note 2, at 545-52 (discussing
Justice Stevens’s tendency to limit the scope of First Amendment decisions).
43. Stevens, supra note 33, at 1305.
44. Id. at 1302; see also Sickels, supra note 1, at 43 (describing Justice Stevens’s First
Amendment opinions as reflecting a “consistent preference for fact-gathering and
individualizing, though not to the point of doing without explicit judge-made categories”);
Popkin, supra note 2, at 1106 (noting that “Justice Stevens’ commitment to case-by-case
deliberation makes him suspicious of judicial generalities”).
45. Stevens, supra note 33, at 1307.
46. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277-78 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring
in the judgment) (contending that educational administrators properly may consider content
of student activities in deciding how to allocate meeting space).
47. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524 (2001).
48. See id. at 529 (citing “this Court’s repeated refusal to answer categorically whether
truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment”).
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stand in relation to economically and socially powerful institutions? Does
the speech restriction at issue, by its nature, pose a disproportionate threat
to the expressive interests of economically and/or politically marginal
speakers? If the Court lets the restriction stand, will it narrow the scope of
public debate? These questions have caused Justice Stevens to invoke the
First Amendment most vigorously against economically and politically
skewed speech restrictions to ensure that public debate will benefit from the
perspectives of economically and politically marginal speakers. Through
his pragmatic commitments, Justice Stevens has arrived at a populist
approach to expressive freedom.
2. Pragmatism Before Populism: City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent
One can distinguish Justice Stevens’s pragmatic populism from a simple
normative preference for certain results in First Amendment cases by
recognizing that his substantive and methodological pragmatism did not
immediately lead him to a populist emphasis on socially marginal
expression. During the Justice’s first decade on the Court, he wrote for a
6-3 majority in City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,49 rejecting a political
candidate’s First Amendment challenge to a Los Angeles ordinance that
prevented him from posting campaign signs on public property. The
opinion carries many hallmarks of Justice Stevens’s pragmatic First
Amendment theory and his pragmatic methodology for analyzing cases. At
bottom, however, the opinion places deference to legislative priorities and
judgments ahead of any concern about underlying disparities in economic
or political power.
Substantively, Justice Stevens begins his First Amendment analysis in
Taxpayers for Vincent by noting that any effort “to suppress support for a
minority party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of
certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas”50 would plainly
violate the First Amendment. This framing of the issue echoes Justice
Stevens’s earlier acknowledgements of dissident speakers’ importance for
effective public discourse.51 Methodologically, the opinion begins by
dismantling the respondents’ efforts to present the case as a facial
challenge, a classic pragmatic move to contain the scope of the decision.52
Balancing the parties’ interests, Justice Stevens credits the city’s aesthetic
interest in “eliminating visual clutter”53 based on the trial court’s finding
that Vincent’s signs constituted the sort of clutter the city was trying to
eliminate.54 He mentions in a footnote the importance of preserving

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

466 U.S. 789 (1984).
Id. at 804.
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796-803.
Id. at 808.
See id. (discussing the district court’s finding of fact).
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inexpensive modes of communication55 but concludes that public speaking
or leafleting could provide the respondents with a comparably practical and
Finally, he rejects the
cost-effective mode of communication.56
respondents’ efforts to resolve the case categorically under the public forum
doctrine, noting the incongruity of an argument that utility poles are
traditionally open to expressive activity.57
Justice Stevens’s analysis in Taxpayers for Vincent, however, abjures any
special concern for the expressive interests of underfinanced speakers or
political dissenters. Can Justice Stevens really be correct to assert that the
case presents “not even a hint of bias or censorship,”58 given the fact that
the city government acted to suppress an electoral challenge to its own
authority? Does public speaking or leafleting really offer these speakers, in
this setting, an effective substitute for posting signs? The opinion tells us
nothing about the Vincent campaign’s financial state or tactical
considerations, but presumably the respondents litigated this case all the
way to the Supreme Court for a reason. At the level of balancing, does the
city’s aesthetic interest really withstand the argument that signage on
private property undermines the city’s goal? Justice Stevens dismisses that
argument by reference to the sanctity of property rights,59 which seems
irrelevant to the conflict between expression and aesthetics, and to the
potential utility of private property as an alternative space for signs,60 which
seems to beg the question.
Justice William Brennan’s dissent in Taxpayers for Vincent considers
most of the practical concerns that Justice Stevens ignores, particularly
stressing the utility of signs for underfunded speakers and questioning the
utility of alternative means of expression.61 Ahead of these practical
arguments, however, Justice Brennan principally expresses categorical
55. See id. at 812 n.30 (acknowledging the Court’s “special solicitude for forms of
expression that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence may be
important to a large segment of the citizenry” but emphasizing that “this solicitude has
practical boundaries”).
56. See id. at 812.
57. See id. at 814.
58. See id. at 804.
59. See id. at 811 (“The private citizen’s interest in controlling the use of his own
property justifies the disparate treatment.”).
60. See id. (asserting that “by not extending the ban to all locations, a significant
opportunity to communicate by means of temporary signs is preserved”).
61. See id. at 818-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Taxpayers for Vincent did not mark the
first time Justice Brennan faulted a Stevens majority opinion for ignoring the economically
skewed effects of a speech regulation. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978),
Justice Stevens sought to minimize the consequences for adults of an Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) restriction on “indecent” broadcasts, as applied to
George Carlin’s “seven dirty words” monologue, by noting that adults who wished to hear
such material “may purchase tapes and records or go to theaters and nightclubs.” Id. at 750
n.28. Justice William Brennan fired back that such reasoning reflected “a sad insensitivity to
the fact that these alternatives involve the expenditure of money, time, and effort that many
of those wishing to hear Mr. Carlin’s message may not be able to afford.” Id. at 774
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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mistrust of aesthetic justifications for speech restrictions.62 Among other
concerns, Justice Brennan indicts aesthetic justifications as easy pretexts for
substantive biases.63 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion contains no
thematic response to Justice Brennan’s dissent, but he may have viewed
Justice Brennan’s position as reflecting a categorical prejudgment about the
interests at stake. Moreover, he may conceivably have viewed Justice
Brennan’s position as reflecting a settled normative preference for
particular results in free speech disputes or in broader societal conflicts.
Justice Stevens’s opinion, whatever the blind spots in its analysis,
approaches the case from a practical perspective that acknowledges both the
value of expressive freedom and the legitimacy of government regulation.
Pragmatic reasoning depends, above all, on the wisdom of accumulated
experience. Although Part II of this Article discusses several emblematic
pragmatic populist opinions of Justice Stevens that preceded Taxpayers for
Vincent, that case demonstrates that Justice Stevens’s consistent concern for
economic and political inequities in free speech controversies emerged from
an evolutionary process rather than a normative reflex. At times prior to
Taxpayers for Vincent, and with increasing consistency in the years that
followed, Justice Stevens has blazed a trail from his substantive and
methodological First Amendment pragmatism to a doctrine that vigorously
protects the interests of economically and politically marginal speakers.64
The result is a free speech jurisprudence as attentive as Justice Brennan’s to
the special importance of protecting marginalized speakers and advancing
public debate, but one whose pragmatic roots may have enhanced its
persuasive force during the conservative judicial ascendancy that has
marked Justice Stevens’s tenure on the Court.
II. THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO EXPRESSIVE FREEDOM OF JUSTICE
STEVENS’S PRAGMATIC POPULISM
Justice Stevens’s pragmatic populism speaks to questions of expressive
freedom with a distinctive voice. In the relatively rare cases over the past
three decades where the Court has acknowledged the special importance of
preserving expressive opportunities for people and institutions with limited
social power, Justice Stevens almost exclusively has written the majority
opinions. On the more frequent occasions when the Court has analyzed
62. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 821-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. See id. at 822 (“The asserted interest in aesthetics may be only a facade for contentbased suppression.”).
64. In this respect, Justice Stevens has followed similar trajectories in his approaches to
expressive freedom and to the problem of affirmative action under the Equal Protection
Clause, gradually developing a normative perspective on regulation based on an accretion of
information about power dynamics in American society. Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 533 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing a federal racial set-aside
program in the context of “[o]ur historic aversion to titles of nobility”), with Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is no
moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste
system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.”).
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First Amendment disputes without regard to salient disparities in social
power, or has invoked the First Amendment to expand expressive
opportunities for socially powerful interests at the expense of socially
weaker interests, Justice Stevens has repeatedly and convincingly criticized
the majority’s reasoning. The shape and effect of his pragmatic populist
free speech jurisprudence emerges in the context of two critical areas of
disparate social power: money and politics.
A. Pragmatic Populism and the Economic Cost of Speech
In the years following Taxpayers for Vincent, a concern with maintaining
opportunities for communication without regard to the speaker’s means has
become one of the central features of Justice Stevens’s approach to the First
Amendment. That concern follows naturally from Justice Stevens’s
commitment to open, robust democratic discourse. Democracy requires
equal rights of participation in public debate. If economically dominant
people and institutions can use their superior economic resources to
dominate public debate, then democratic discourse cannot occur.
1. Preserving Inexpensive Means of Communication
Justice Stevens has worked tirelessly to preserve inexpensive media,
whether ancient or cutting edge, that are—in words he recently invoked—
“essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.”65 His emblematic
opinion of this sort came in City of Ladue v. Gilleo.66 In that case, a
Missouri town had enacted a ban on most residential signs that had the
practical effect of barring political signs. The Court’s decision to strike
down the ban was unanimous, but Justice Stevens’s reasoning in the
majority opinion set a distinctive tone. At its core, the decision faults the
ordinance for restricting “too much speech.”67 That complaint may seem
counterintuitive, given the relatively small place of residential signs in the
overall scheme of communication, but Justice Stevens emphasizes two
defining characteristics of the medium: its deep roots in social practice68
and its special value for underfinanced speakers. “Residential signs,” he
notes, “are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication.
Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or
window sign may have no practical substitute.”69 Justice Stevens makes a
point of distinguishing Ladue from Taxpayers for Vincent on the ground of

65. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943), quoted in Watchtower Bible
& Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 163 (2002).
66. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
67. Id. at 55.
68. See id. at 54 (calling the residential sign “a venerable means of communication”).
69. Id. at 57.
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social practice,70 although not on the ground that residential signs have
greater utility than signs on public property for less affluent speakers.71
The following term, Justice Stevens handed down another majority
opinion that expanded on the distinctive expressive interests of
economically marginal speakers. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission72
presented a free speech challenge to an Ohio ban on anonymous political
leaflets. Ohio argued that anonymous leaflets corroded political discourse
by depriving the public of a critical piece of information: the identity of the
person advancing an argument.73 In the abstract, the argument carries
substantial force. But Justice Stevens’s majority opinion, placing greater
value on the speaker’s practical opportunity to participate in political
debate,74 concentrates on the practical extent to which the ban
disproportionately affects speakers whose “fear of economic or official
retaliation [or] concern about social ostracism”75 is most likely to deter
them from expressing their views. “[A]nonymous pamphleteering,” he
writes, “exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First
Amendment in particular:
to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant
society.”76 Ohio’s ban, like the ordinance struck down in Ladue, also
singled out a communicative medium especially useful for modestly funded
speakers.77
Reno v. ACLU78 carries Justice Stevens’s commitment to preserving
inexpensive means of democratic discourse from the town square into
70. See id. at 54.
71. Interesting in this regard are Justice Stevens’s precise, repeated references in Ladue
to the burdened class of speakers as “residents” rather than “homeowners.” See id. at 56
(“[d]isplaying a sign from one’s own residence”); id. at 57 (“a person who puts up a sign at
her residence”). The opinion manifestly acknowledges the interests of nonowner residents
when it contrasts the incentives “individual residents” have “to keep their own property
values up and to prevent ‘visual clutter’ in their own yards and neighborhoods” with the
incentives of “persons who erect signs on others’ land, in others’ neighborhoods, or on
public property.” Id. at 58.
72. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
73. See id. at 342 n.5 (acknowledging that mandatory disclosure of the speaker’s identity
“might provide assistance to critics in evaluating the quality and significance of the
writing”).
74. Justice Stevens’s analysis also makes great use of practical reasoning in discrediting
Ohio’s justifications for the ban. The opinion effectively portrays the informational value of
the speaker’s identity as indistinguishable from the value of numerous other pieces of
information that a speaker may choose to exclude. See id. at 348-49. It also indicts the
overbreadth of the ban’s deterrent function against fraudulent and libelous speech. See id. at
349-53.
75. Id. at 341-42.
76. Id. at 357.
77. Another decision in the same vein is Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). Justice Stevens in Watchtower wrote for an
8-1 majority in striking down a municipal requirement that door-to-door canvassers register
with the town and receive a permit, and his opinion revisits central themes of Ladue and
McIntyre. See id. at 163 (emphasizing the importance of door-to-door canvassing as an
effective means of communication for underfinanced or socially marginal speakers).
78. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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cyberspace. The Court’s first confrontation with regulation of the Internet
produced a landmark decision, striking down crudely conceived provisions
of the Federal Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) that sought to bar
“indecent” speech from cyberspace.79 Eschewing broad, affirmative
declarations of principle, Justice Stevens structures his majority opinion in a
characteristically pragmatic manner, explaining in great detail the nature of
the Internet and the challenged regulations.80 Distinguishing the CDA from
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) restrictions on indecent
broadcasting he led the Court in upholding in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,81 Justice Stevens states, “[T]he Internet can hardly be
considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity. It provides relatively
unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds.”82 He
emphasizes the practical similarities between this most advanced form of
communications technologies and older inexpensive media: “Through the
use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through
the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual
can become a pamphleteer.”83 He reiterates this analysis in rejecting the
government’s efforts to save the regulations from overbreadth with an
affirmative defense based on credit card verification, noting that “it is not
economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers to employ such
verification.”84
The relationship between the low cost of communicating over the
Internet and the diversity of voices in public discourse emerges in Justice
Stevens’s separate opinions in several subsequent cases that considered
successor statutes to the CDA. In Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I),85 the
Court approved Congress’s use in the Child Online Protection Act
(“COPA”)86 of “community standards” to define materials restricted as
“harmful to minors.” Justice Stevens dissented, objecting to this extension
of the Miller v. California87 obscenity framework into cyberspace on the
ground that, under a community standards approach, “the community that
wishes to live without certain material rids not only itself, but the entire
Internet, of the offending speech.”88 In Ashcroft II, which affirmed a
preliminary injunction against COPA because less restrictive means existed
79. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1), (d) (1994 & Supp. II).
80. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-61.
81. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
82. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 881; see also id. at 879-80 (rejecting the government’s argument that the
regulations’ less restrictive effect on the World Wide Web ameliorated their more restrictive
effects on other online media on grounds that transferring restricted speech to the Web
“would cost up to $10,000 if the speaker’s interests were not accommodated by an existing
Web site”).
85. 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
86. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1994 & Supp. V).
87. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
88. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to protect children from online indecency,89 Justice Stevens’s concurrence
emphasizes the breadth of the statute’s restrictive effect.90 Another recent
Internet censorship decision upheld the Children’s Internet Protection Act
(“CIPA”) requirement that public libraries that receive federal funds use
filtering software to prevent patrons from accessing material deemed
harmful to minors.91 Justice Stevens once again dissented, reiterating his
opposition to meddling in such a massive, easily accessible communicative
medium92 and emphasizing another feature of the case that resonates with
his pragmatic solicitude for inexpensive sources of information: public
libraries’ special role in educating the populace.93
In all the decisions Justice Stevens has written for the Court that struck
down restrictions on inexpensive media, he has hardly stood alone; a solid
majority signed his opinion in each of them. But no other member of the
Court since Justice Brennan’s retirement has approached Justice Stevens’s
leadership in focusing his colleagues on the equalizing value of inexpensive
communications media. Moreover, Justice Stevens has distinguished
himself in this area even from Justice Brennan. His opinions in the medium
ban cases may lack the righteous passion that characterized, for example,
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Taxpayers for Vincent.94 However, Justice
Stevens’s practical assessments of the economic stakes in these cases may
have cemented his majorities. He has repeatedly established that marginal
speakers’ participation improves social debate and that bans on media
distinctly useful for those speakers impose commensurate practical costs.
2. Curbing Financial Disincentives to Expression
The Supreme Court over the past two decades has paid unprecedented
attention to restrictions on financial remuneration for speech. Arkansas
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland95 and Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of the New York State Crime Victims Board96 place strict limits on
government’s ability to impose content-based financial restrictions on
expression. These decisions accurately recognize that restrictions on
financial rewards for expressive activity may damage the “marketplace of

89. See Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
90. See id. at 706-07 (Stevens, J., concurring).
91. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
92. See id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The effect of [the Children’s Internet
Protection Act-mandated] overblocking is the functional equivalent of a host of individual
decisions excluding hundreds of thousands of individual constitutionally protected messages
from Internet terminals located in public libraries throughout the Nation.”).
93. See id. at 225-26.
94. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
95. 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (striking down a state sales tax that applied to some, but not all,
magazines).
96. 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (striking down a state law that required publishers of criminals’
accounts of their criminal activities to place profits in an escrow fund to benefit crime
victims).
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ideas.”97 They make no attempt, however, to assess the actual effects of
financial restrictions on particular speakers and, consequently, on public
debate. In Simon & Schuster, for example, the Court struck down New
York’s “Son of Sam” law, which required any publisher of a work that
described the author’s criminal activities to place profits from the work in
escrow for five years to provide compensation for victims of the author’s
crimes.98 The Court’s analysis addressed neither the economic status of
convicted criminals nor the particular value the public might derive from
frank accounts of criminal activity. Instead it focused, as Ragland had,99 on
content-based discrimination in the abstract, decrying the state for
“singl[ing] out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it
places on no other speech and no other income.”100
Justice Stevens joined the Court’s opinion in Simon & Schuster, but his
own majority opinions on financial disincentives focus much more directly
on the economic consequences of barring financial remuneration for speech
in particular contexts. In Meyer v. Grant,101 he wrote for a unanimous
Court in striking down Colorado’s ban on paying circulators of initiative
petitions. Rather than abstractly characterizing the ban as a content-based
encroachment on negative autonomy rights, Justice Stevens’s analysis
focuses on two concrete consequences of the ban for the particular speakers
it actually burdened. First, the ban stifled specifically political expression,
both by muffling initiative advocates’ voices during petition drives and by
increasing the difficulty of putting an initiative to a statewide vote.102
“Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colorado,”
“[T]heir right freely to engage in
Justice Stevens emphasizes.103
discussions concerning the need for that change is guarded by the First
Amendment.”104 Second, the ban “restricts access to the most effective,
fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse, direct
one-on-one communication.”105 Thus, as in the inexpensive media cases,
Justice Stevens in Meyer focuses not on individuals’ generic entitlement to
any given means of communication, but rather on modestly funded
97. See, e.g., id. (noting that “the government’s ability to impose content-based burdens
on speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace”).
98. See id. at 108-11 (describing the Son of Sam law).
99. See Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229 (emphasizing the presence of content-based
discrimination as a “particularly repugnant” aspect of the challenged tax). Justice Stevens
wrote a brief concurrence in Ragland for the sole purpose of noting his characteristic refusal
to reject content-based restrictions on speech categorically. See id. at 234-35 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
100. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 123.
101. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
102. See id. at 422-23.
103. Id. at 421.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 424. One might fairly criticize Justice Stevens from a pragmatic standpoint for
failing to recognize the advantages wealthy and powerful interests often enjoy in referendum
and initiative campaigns. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and
Direct Democracy, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1845 (1999).
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advocates’ practical need for access to a particular means of
communication.
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU),106 the
issue of financial disincentives dovetailed with the doctrine of Pickering v.
Board of Education,107 which protects public employees from adverse job
actions based on their speech about matters of public concern.108 NTEU
struck down a federal statute that barred federal employees from receiving
honoraria for their speaking and writing activities. Justice Stevens, as in the
Internet cases, emphasizes the scope of the ban’s effect on speech, assailing
“Congress’[s] wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by a
massive number of potential speakers,”109 and links “the public’s right to
read and hear”110 with the interests of potentially discouraged speakers.
The opinion’s most distinctive feature is its recognition of the practical
importance of honoraria to the ban’s challengers—the class of federal
employees below pay grade GS-16. High government officials, Justice
Stevens observes, receive invitations to speak and write because of their
stature. “In contrast, invitations to rank-and-file employees usually depend
only on the market value of their messages.”111 High officials can benefit
from speaking engagements through the availability of travel
reimbursement. “In contrast, the denial of compensation for lower paid,
nonpolicymaking employees will inevitably diminish their expressive
output.”112 Once again, Justice Stevens articulates a populist take on a
speech problem that the Court otherwise treats as a simple government
encroachment on negative rights.
B. Pragmatic Populism and Participation in Electoral Politics
If a crucial function of speech is to inform the self-governing public,113
then a system of free expression cannot allow existing political power
arrangements to dictate the terms of political debate. Such a dynamic
skews the debate toward the status quo and prevents consideration and
adoption of new ideas. Politically entrenched entities seek to maintain their
primacy just as tenaciously as economically entrenched entities. The First
Amendment, in Justice Stevens’s conception, serves as an important
counterweight to both varieties of power. In cases that deal with the
expressive rights of individual political dissenters, the systemic role of
106. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
107. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
108. See id. at 568.
109. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467 (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 470.
111. Id. at 469.
112. Id. at 469-70. The honoraria ban disproportionately burdened lower-paid employees
even though, as Justice Stevens noted, the government had defended the ban based on the
need to curb improprieties by members of Congress, and the only instances of arguably
improper honoraria the government had shown involved higher-paid employees. See id. at
472 & n.18, 473 & n.19.
113. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
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minor political parties, and the role of money in perpetuating political
dominance, the Justice has developed a distinctive populist response to the
majority’s negative conception of political speech. In each of these
contexts, he emphasizes the pragmatic concern with facilitating broad-based
participation in the electoral process in order to ensure the public’s access to
a broad range of political ideas.114
1. Protecting the Rights of Political Dissenters
Early in his time on the Court, Justice Stevens authored a defense of
political dissenters’ expressive freedom whose force the Court has never
matched in the ensuing years. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,115
the Mississippi Supreme Court pronounced the organizers of a civil rights
boycott jointly and severally liable for several acts of violent and coercive
discipline that occurred in the course of the boycott.116 Justice Stevens’s
opinion reversing that judgment presumes political advocacy’s centrality to
constitutional expressive freedom, quoting Justice Wiley Rutledge: “‘The
First Amendment is a charter for government, not for an institution of
learning.’”117 He portrays the boycott organizers’ actions as quintessential
political speech and emphasizes the special importance of political
expression aimed at altering existing social hierarchies. “Through speech,
assembly, and petition,” he explains, “petitioners sought to change a social
order that had consistently treated them as second-class citizens.”118 Such
advocacy for change is too important for states to undermine with broad
brush theories of liability. “A massive and prolonged effort to change the
social, political, and economic structure of a local environment cannot be
characterized as a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral
consequences of a relatively few violent acts.”119 Claiborne Hardware
leaves a deep impression because it represents perhaps the most
consequential setting in which the Court has required society to tolerate
some degree of ancillary violence in the name of dynamic political dissent.
114. This same concern animates many of Justice Stevens’s opinions in the voting rights
area—leading him, for example, to take the problem of partisan gerrymandering more
seriously than most on the Court, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 319 (2004) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (contending that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable), and to
recognize the incongruity of invoking the Equal Protection Clause to eviscerate remedies in
the district-drawing process for racial minority groups that have historically suffered
deliberate discrimination in that process, see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 676-77 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (challenging the constitutional basis for racial gerrymandering claim
based on white voters’ objections to the state’s effort to vindicate African-Americans’ voting
rights).
115. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
116. See id. at 903-06 (describing violent aspects of the boycott).
117. Id. at 910 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)); see also id. at 913
(“This Court has recognized that expression on public issues ‘has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 467 (1980))).
118. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912.
119. Id. at 933.
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Justice Stevens has also strengthened constitutional protection for
political dissent by shielding government employees from an even more
threatening financial disincentive to expression than the federal honorarium
ban struck down in the NTEU case:120 political patronage systems, which
condition public employment decisions on allegiance to the party in power.
The Court first invoked the First Amendment against patronage in Elrod v.
Burns,121 imposing strict scrutiny on public employers who threatened to
fire public employees whose job functions did not require political loyalty
in order to secure the employees’ political subservience. Justice Stevens
wrote the majority opinion in a follow-up case, Branti v. Finkel,122 which
extended the Elrod rule to a situation in which the employer planned to fire
employees without any initial threat.123
A decade later, Justice Stevens gave a forceful account of the harms
patronage imposes on democracy. In Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois,124 a bare 5-4 majority extended the Elrod rule to hiring and
promotion decisions. Justice Stevens’s concurrence uses the misdeeds of
his own state political party of record as a vehicle for explaining the
importance of the First Amendment for confronting entrenched political
power. Responding to Justice Antonin Scalia’s biting dissent,125 Justice
Stevens makes two key points emblematic of his pragmatic populism. First,
reflecting the importance of speakers’ economic status and interest in
evaluating burdens on expression, he exposes the logical flaws in Justice
Scalia’s assertion that patronage exacts little practical cost on employees.126
Justice Stevens identifies “the harsh reality of party discipline”127 as “[t]he
iron fist inside the velvet glove of Justice Scalia’s ‘inducements’ and
‘influences.’”128 Second, Justice Stevens dismantles Justice Scalia’s
argument that a patronage system’s tendency to secure the dominant
political party’s control of government provides a net benefit to
democracy.129 As if unlocking a time capsule, Justice Stevens unearths a
1973 Seventh Circuit decision he authored, Illinois State Employees Union
v. Lewis,130 which discredits patronage from the standpoint of a
substantively pragmatic account of expressive freedom:131
[I]t is appropriate not merely to consider the rights of a particular janitor
who may have been offered a bribe from the public treasury to obtain his
political surrender, but also the impact on the body politic as a whole
120. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
121. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
122. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
123. See id. at 516-17.
124. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
125. See id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 109-10.
127. Id. at 89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 89 n.6 (quoting id. at 109-10 (Scalia, J. dissenting)).
129. See id. at 106-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. 473 F.2d 561 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
131. See supra notes 32-41 (explaining Justice Stevens’s substantive free speech
pragmatism).
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when the free political choice of millions of public servants is inhibited or
manipulated by the selective award of public benefits. While the
patronage system is defended in the name of democratic tradition, its
paternalistic impact on the political process is actually at war with the
deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.132

Justice Stevens’s Rutan concurrence emphasizes that the democratic
system, and not just the individual employees forced to choose between
conscience and livelihood, pays the cost of political patronage.
2. Protecting Electoral Rights of Political Outliers
One of the Rehnquist Court’s most emphatic but least noted contributions
to First Amendment doctrine has been its denigration of minor political
parties’ free speech interests. The Court in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party133 upheld a state ban on “fusion candidacies,” a strategically
popular device by which a minor party grants its nomination and ballot line
to the willing nominee of one of the major parties. In Clingman v.
Beaver,134 the Court rejected a minor party’s challenge to a state prohibition
against parties’ choosing to open their primary elections to registered
members of other parties. Methodologically, these decisions minimize the
minor parties’ First Amendment interests through an analysis that almost
comically ignores political reality and the power differential between major
and minor political parties. According to the Court, minor parties need not
invite major party voters to participate into their primaries because those
voters can always desert the major parties and join the minor party.135
Likewise, fusion candidacies offer no benefit to minor parties because
minor parties can simply persuade major party candidates to switch party
affiliations.136 Substantively, the Court explicitly extols preservation of the
two-party system to justify encroachments on minor parties’ expressive
freedom. As the Chief Justice wrote in Timmons, “the States’ interest [in
political stability] permits them . . . to decide that political stability is best
served through a healthy two-party system.”137 In other words, denying a
political challenger the opportunity to spread his or her ideas does not
violate the First Amendment as long as the denial helps preserve the
exclusive platform occupied by the dominant parties.138

132. Lewis, 473 F.2d at 576, quoted in Rutan, 497 U.S. at 91-92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
133. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
134. 125 S. Ct. 2029 (2005).
135. See id. at 2035-36 (plurality opinion) (“Nothing in [the challenged provision]
prevents members of other parties from switching their registration to the [Libertarian Party]
or to Independent status.”).
136. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 360 (explaining that “[the New Party] is free to try to
convince [an incumbent Democratic state representative] to be the New Party’s, not the
[Democratic Party’s], candidate”).
137. Id. at 367.
138. For a detailed examination of recent First Amendment doctrine as it relates to minor
political parties, see Magarian, supra note 11.
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During the Burger years, Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in
Anderson v. Celebrezze,139 probably the high watermark of judicial efforts
to safeguard minor parties’ role in the electoral process. Anderson struck
down, by a tenuous 5-4 majority, Ohio’s requirement that independent
candidates for the presidency file nominating petitions seventy-five days
before the statutory date for party primary elections.140 Justice Stevens’s
First Amendment analysis focuses not on the immediate burden Ohio
imposed on independent candidates but rather on voters’ interest in
considering a broad range of electoral choices. “By limiting the
opportunities of independent-minded voters to associate in the electoral
arena to enhance their political effectiveness as a group,” he declares, “such
restrictions threaten to reduce diversity and competition in the marketplace
of ideas.”141 In explaining the Ohio law’s constitutional defects, Justice
Stevens sounds many themes central to advocacy of minor parties’ electoral
rights. He recognizes courts’ special responsibility to safeguard minor
party voters’ expressive and associational rights “because the interests of
minor parties and independent candidates are not well represented in state
legislatures.”142 He extols minor parties’ value throughout U.S. history as
“fertile sources of new ideas and new programs,” many of which “have in
time made their way into the political mainstream.”143 He stresses the
value of decisional flexibility in the electoral process;144 conversely, in a
move that Timmons will directly contradict, he discredits Ohio’s asserted
interest in “political stability” as an interest in “protecting the Republican
and Democratic Parties from external competition” and makes clear that
such an interest “cannot justify the virtual exclusion of other political
aspirants from the political arena.”145
As the Court in the Rehnquist years has grown hostile toward minor
parties’ free speech claims, Justice Stevens has donned the mantle of minor
parties’ consistent defender. First, he acknowledges the obvious fact,
invisible through the Court’s formalist goggles, that the two major parties
control almost all government in the United States and therefore possess the
motive and the means to stifle competition from minor parties.146
Accordingly, he recognizes that the state restrictions challenged in Timmons
139. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
140. See id. at 782-83 (explaining Ohio’s regulatory scheme). Although the statute
challenged in Anderson specifically dealt with the mechanics of independent candidacies,
this discussion uses the generic phrase “minor parties” to encompass independent
candidacies as well as candidacies backed by organized political parties other than the
Democrats and Republicans.
141. Id. at 794.
142. Id. at 793 n.16.
143. Id. at 794.
144. “In election campaigns, particularly those which are national in scope, the candidates
and the issues simply do not remain static over time.” Id. at 790.
145. Id. at 802.
146. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 378 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Clingman v. Beaver, 125 S. Ct. 2029, 2047-48 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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and Clingman, contrary to the Court’s assurances, present serious threats to
minor parties’ electoral activities.147 Second, Justice Stevens repudiates the
idea that the established political power structure has any constitutionally
salient prerogative to preserve itself at the expense of challengers’ right to
advance their positions. Consistent with his view of expressive freedom as
an essential guarantor of informed and robust democratic debate, he departs
from the Court in recognizing “the virtues of the minor party challenge to
entrenched viewpoints”148 and the importance of “voters with viewpoints
not adequately represented by the platforms of the two major parties.”149
Undermining minor parties’ expressive freedom, as he first wrote in
Anderson, damages the political process: “[I]t is a central theme of our
jurisprudence,” he reiterates in Timmons, “that the entire electorate . . . will
benefit from robust competition in ideas and governmental policies . . . .”150
Accordingly, he would let minor parties avail themselves of techniques
such as fusion candidacies and open primaries.
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,151 the Court
upheld a public broadcaster’s standardless decision to exclude an
independent candidate from a televised debate, perhaps the most significant
forum a campaign can offer, based on little more than the broadcaster’s
assurance that the candidate’s viewpoint had not caused the exclusion.152
Echoing its willingness in Timmons to trade the expressive opportunities of
political dissidents for the expressive security of the politically
entrenched,153 the Court warned that any standard that might expand a
debate to more than two candidates could lead broadcasters to abandon
debates altogether.154 Justice Stevens, dissenting again, emphasizes the
station’s governmental status155 and assails the Court’s refusal to demand
even the most rudimentary procedural requirements in a governmental
authority’s decision to disadvantage an electoral challenger.156 He finds the
absence of decisional standards especially troubling in light of the station’s
conspicuous rejection of the only independent candidate to request a place
in the debates157 and the broadcaster’s reliance on the independent
147. See Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2048-49 (discussing the serious burden a semi-closed
primary imposes on both voters and minor parties); Timmons, 520 U.S. at 371-74 (discussing
the serious burden a fusion ban imposes on minor parties).
148. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 380.
149. Id. at 381.
150. Id. at 382; see also Clingman, 125 S. Ct. at 2054 (“Decisions that give undue
deference to the interest in preserving the two-party system . . . enhance the likelihood that
so-called ‘safe districts’ will play an increasingly predominant role in the electoral
process.”).
151. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
152. See id. at 682-83 (upholding the broadcaster’s exclusion of a candidate as a
viewpoint-neutral regulation in a nonpublic forum).
153. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
154. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680-82.
155. See id. at 686-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 690-95 (criticizing the arbitrary character of a broadcaster’s decision to
exclude an independent candidate).
157. See id. at 692 n.14.
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candidate’s modest financial support—a factor Justice Stevens suggests
could have cut in favor of giving the candidate a forum.158
Justice Stevens’s solicitude for political outliers extends beyond the
specific context of minor party candidacies to embrace the interests of
voters to whom electoral structures deny a meaningful voice in electoral
decisions. In California Democratic Party v. Jones,159 the Court struck
down a provision of California’s constitution that mandated “blanket”
primary elections, which allowed voters to select a candidate of any party
for each office on the ballot. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion applied a
quintessential negative rights analysis to the case, holding that the blanket
primary represented the state government’s effort to undermine political
parties’ “right not to associate” with nonmembers.160 In sharp contrast,
Justice Stevens’s dissent portrays the blanket primary as a means toward
“progressive inclusion of the entire electorate in the process of selecting
their public officials.”161 He emphasizes the interests of voters who do not
belong to the dominant party in “safe seat” districts to participate
meaningfully in what, as a practical matter, is often the decisive stage of the
electoral process.162 In a signature rhetorical reversal, he exposes the
majority’s shallow First Amendment foundation: “When a State acts not to
limit democratic participation but to expand the ability of individuals to
participate in the democratic process, it is acting not as a foe of the First
Amendment but as a friend and ally.”163
Justice Stevens does not depart from the majority in these cases out of
some political allegiance with minor parties or electoral outliers. To the
158. See id. at 692. Justice Stevens’s dissent in Forbes, along with his dissent in United
States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194, 220 (2003), see supra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text, also illustrates—by omission—another aspect of his pragmatic First
Amendment jurisprudence. In both cases, the Court uses public forum analysis to help
justify decisions to uphold restrictive government actions. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S.
at 205-09 (plurality opinion) (rejecting public forum analysis in the context of libraries’
content decisions as insufficiently restrictive of individual rights); Forbes, 523 U.S. at 67682 (determining that a candidate debate on a public broadcasting station is a nonpublic
forum). Justice Stevens’s pragmatic methodology disdains rigid legal categories. See supra
notes 42-48 and accompanying text. Accordingly, his dissents in these cases completely
forego public forum analysis in favor of evaluating the particular facts of the cases in light of
the constitutional interests the challenged government actions affect.
159. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
160. Id. at 574.
161. Id. at 598-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 600-01 (discussing the interests behind California voters’ adoption of a
blanket primary).
163. Id. at 595-96. Outside the electoral arena, Justice Stevens has shown a similar
concern for social power differentials in the context of media access to government
information. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582-84 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring), even as he praises the Court’s recognition of a media access right
to criminal proceedings, he notes the incongruity of recognizing that right in a case where
“we are protecting the interests of the most powerful voices in the community,” id. at 583,
and not in an earlier case about media access to a jail, which “involved the plight of a
segment of society least able to protect itself.” Id. (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S.
1 (1978)).
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contrary, he expresses great admiration for the two-party system,164 and he
recognizes states’ substantial latitude to regulate electoral processes by
imposing on minor parties such legal disadvantages as single-member
districts with winner-take-all voting.165 What he opposes in these cases are
efforts by entrenched political powers, such as the major political parties, to
sustain their dominance through the specific mechanism of muffling
dissidents’ contributions to political debate. He defends the rights of minor
political parties and disaffected voters to participate in the electoral process
because he believes, based on his best understanding of American
democracy, that outliers’ advocacy and energy contribute substantially to
the health of our political system.166 He invokes the First Amendment as a
purposive vehicle toward vital, inclusive political discourse.
3. Allowing Campaign Finance Regulation in Order to Advance
Democracy
Until the past decade, Justice Stevens maintained a relatively low profile
in the Court’s ongoing battles over attempts to regulate the use of money in
political campaigns. However, in a brief dissent in Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC,167 he staked out a bold position:
I believe the Government has an important interest in leveling the
electoral playing field by constraining the cost of federal campaigns. . . .
It is quite wrong to assume that the net effect of limits on contributions
and expenditures—which tend to protect equal access to the political
arena . . .—will be adverse to the interest in informed debate protected by
the First Amendment.168

As discussed above, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo169 emphatically
rejected just such an equalization rationale for campaign finance
regulation—a rejection that exemplifies the Court’s negative free speech
jurisprudence.170 Four years after Justice Stevens extolled equalization in
Colorado Republican, his concurring opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri

164. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 381 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The strength of the two-party system—and of each of its major components—
is the product of the power of the ideas, the traditions, the candidates, and the voters that
constitute the two parties.”).
165. See id. at 379-80.
166. Justice Stevens’s view of minor parties’ First Amendment rights is distinctive
enough that only Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg fully joined his dissents from Timmons and
Clingman. Justice David Souter joined both dissents in part, but he conspicuously declined
to join the sections in which Justice Stevens criticized the majority for allowing states to act
in defense of the two-party system. See id. at 382-84 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
the state could argue persuasively that the stability of the two-party system justifies curbs on
minor parties).
167. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
168. Id. at 649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
170. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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Government PAC171 took aim at another key piece of the Buckley reasoning
by declaring that “[m]oney is property; it is not speech.”172 He explains,
Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multitude of
tasks on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football field.
Money, meanwhile, has the power to pay hired laborers to perform the
same tasks. It does not follow, however, that the First Amendment
provides the same measure of protection to the use of money to
accomplish such goals as it provides to the use of ideas to achieve the
same results.173

Justice Stevens’s brief but emphatic statements in these two cases stress the
importance of equal participation in politics for public debate and,
accordingly, for democracy itself.
Justice Stevens’s campaign finance populism did not linger at the
margins for long. In 2003, he and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
coauthored the lead opinion in McConnell v. FEC,174 which upheld key
elements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002—the most
sweeping new federal campaign finance regulations since the provisions
that gave rise to Buckley. The coauthorship of the lead opinion complicates
attribution of the McConnell reasoning, but Justice Stevens’s statements in
Colorado Republican and Nixon contain the seeds of central elements in
McConnell. The opinion opens with the most vigorous defense of the need
for campaign finance regulation that five Justices have ever signed,
emphasizing the danger of allowing concentrations of wealth to dominate
the political process.175 It proceeds to defend the Act’s restrictions on the
use of “soft money”176 to assist federal campaigns on the ground that those
restrictions “do[] little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals,
corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence
federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders.”177 In
considering the government’s justifications for the soft money restrictions,
the opinion embraces an extremely broad conception of the anticorruption
rationale recognized in Buckley, encompassing not just quid pro quo
corruption but also “the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on
the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes
of those who have made large financial contributions.”178

171. 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (reaffirming the Buckley distinction between presumptive
constitutional permissibility of contribution limits and impermissibility of expenditure
limits).
172. Id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173. Id.
174. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
175. See id. at 115-16.
176. “Soft money” refers to certain contributions collected by state party organizations.
For a thorough explanation, see id. at 122-26.
177. Id. at 153.
178. Id. at 154. See generally id. at 143-54 (elaborating on the broad conception of a
corruption justification for finance regulations).
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These elements of McConnell retool important aspects of the Buckley
doctrine179 along populist lines. Buckley dismissed any thought of
equalizing influence in the political process as impermissible government
favoritism among speakers. McConnell, in contrast, centrally justifies
campaign finance regulations as checks against political dominance by the
wealthy. Buckley established a First Amendment right to make independent
political expenditures, and the Court’s subsequent decision in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti180 left no doubt that right extended to
corporations. McConnell, in contrast, frankly identifies the danger that the
wealthy will dominate the political process as a proper, even necessary,
factor in evaluating campaign finance regulations.181 In Buckley, the
corruption rationale provided a relatively narrow ground for limiting
contributions, and the Court squarely rejected the equalization rationale.
McConnell, in contrast, effectively broadens the corruption rationale to
encompass concerns about unequal access to the political process. Justice
Scalia is not wrong when he fumes in his separate McConnell opinion that
the Stevens-O’Connor majority implicitly distinguishes money from
speech182 and explicitly holds corporate campaign speech subject to
abridgement.183 McConnell represents the Court’s most serious effort in
decades to focus its analysis of electoral regulations on a vision of broadly
inclusive participatory democracy.
Justice Stevens’s allowance for campaign finance regulations in these
cases has technically resulted in votes against First Amendment claimants,
but the claimants sought a constitutional shield for their political
dominance. The Justice’s reasoning makes clear that he views the
regulations at issue as enhancing rather than limiting democratic political
debate. This apparent inversion, informed by a keen awareness of how
social power affects expressive opportunities, provides a way of thinking
about other areas in which Justice Stevens has voted to reject First
Amendment claims.
III. PRAGMATIC POPULISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE STEVENS’S FIRST
AMENDMENT
Justice Stevens’s jurisprudence in cases about financial and political
inclusiveness marks him as a paladin of First Amendment rights for
claimants whose opportunities to participate in public debate hang by the
179. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
180. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
181. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114-17 (framing the history of campaign finance
regulation in terms of congressional concern about political dominance by the wealthy).
182. See id. at 248-55 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
183. See id. at 255-63. As Justice Scalia acknowledges, see id. at 257, this aspect of the
McConnell majority’s reasoning has firm roots in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), whose upholding of a state restriction on direct corporate
electoral expenditures marks the Court’s most important vindication of campaign finance
regulations between Buckley and McConnell.
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slenderest of threads. However, two recent academic critics—Robert
Nagel184 and Arthur Hellman185—have indicted Justice Stevens for failing
to go the same distance in defense of free speech claims associated in
varying ways with the political right. Both Nagel and Hellman try to parlay
asserted inconsistencies in the Justice’s opinions into evidence of politically
liberal bias. This part examines Justice Stevens’s skeptical responses to
two groups of free speech claimants discussed by Nagel and Hellman,
respectively: speakers who seek protection for attacks on socially marginal
or weak groups or individuals, and commercial advertisers. Rather than
bearing a political animus against these claimants, Justice Stevens questions
their free speech claims for the same reason he champions the claims of
economically and politically marginal speakers. His opinions in these lines
of cases fulfill the pragmatic populism of his broader free speech
jurisprudence by seeking to maintain an inclusive and robust public debate.
A. Speech that Tends to Exclude Distinct Groups from Democratic
Discourse
Robert Nagel’s attack on Justice Stevens’s First Amendment
jurisprudence pivots on Hill v. Colorado.186 There the Justice wrote for a
6-3 majority in upholding, against a challenge by pro-life activists,
Colorado’s prohibition on coming within eight feet of any unwilling listener
in a 100-foot radius from any health care facility. While Nagel
acknowledges that Justice Stevens’s characteristically pragmatic analysis in
Hill “could be a step toward a more thoughtful and realistic methodology in
free speech cases,”187 he attempts to discredit the analysis by contrasting it
with Justice Stevens’s assertedly contradictory approaches in several other
recent cases. One of Nagel’s central counterexamples is Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale,188 in which the Justice opposed the Court’s invocation of
the First Amendment’s protection of expressive association to shield the
Boy Scouts’ policy of excluding gay scoutmasters. Nagel does not, but
fairly could, extend his critique to another context, the cross-burning
decisions,189 in which Justice Stevens has expressed far more blunt
antipathy toward the claims of political dissidents on the right.190 Nagel
184. See Robert F. Nagel, Six Opinions by Mr. Justice Stevens: A New Methodology for
Constitutional Cases?, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 509 (2003).
185. See Arthur D. Hellman, Sex, Drugs, and Democracy: Who’s Afraid of Free
Speech?, 41 Brandeis L.J. 417 (2003).
186. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
187. Nagel, supra note 184, at 515.
188. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
189. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (approving bans on cross burning
intended to intimidate viewers but striking down a particular ban before the Court because of
an evidentiary presumption); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down
a municipal bias-motivated crime ordinance).
190. Robert F. Nagel may not have extended his accusations of liberal bias to encompass
the cross-burning cases because Justice Stevens has treated presumably left-wing and rightwing symbolic arsonists with evenhanded disdain. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 436
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for the constitutionality of a state prohibition on flag
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concludes that the Justice’s approach to free speech cases is “opportunistic
rather than iconoclastic”191 and even accuses him of “drawing on—and
giving voice to—the dark fears and suppressive urges that lie very near the
surface of modern political life.”192
The white supremacists who burn crosses, the Boy Scout leaders who
perpetuate a policy of antigay discrimination, and the pro-life protesters
who accost patients at abortion clinics can be grouped in the category of
politically marginal speakers.193 To that extent, they all generically
resemble the civil rights insurgents194 and minor political parties195 whose
free speech claims Justice Stevens has strongly supported. That apparent
similarity underwrites Nagel’s charge that Justice Stevens chooses which
speakers to protect under the First Amendment based upon a “parochial if
not narrowly ideological” bias.196 However, even leaving aside the fact that
Justice Stevens’s positions in the inexpensive media, minor party, and
campaign finance decisions produce no politically consistent group of
winners or losers, Nagel’s polemic ignores the element that Justice Stevens
himself identifies as driving his views in the cross-burning, Boy Scout, and
abortion protest cases. All of these claimants sought First Amendment
cover for assaults on weak or vulnerable people. Justice Stevens objects to
that use of the First Amendment for the same reason he invokes the First
Amendment in the cases discussed in Part II: He believes the First
Amendment serves to include people in democratic discourse, not to
facilitate actions that threaten their capacities to participate in it. His
pragmatic assessment of the circumstances in each case dictates how he
should resolve the case in order to maximize the inclusiveness and vitality
of public debate.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,197 Justice Stevens strongly disputed a 5-4
majority’s reasoning in striking down a bias-motivated crime ordinance that
St. Paul officials employed to prosecute a white supremacist for burning a
cross on an African-American family’s lawn. His opinion begins with a
statement that perfectly ties his rejection of substantive First Amendment
protection for such expressive activity to his pragmatic philosophy:
burning, even as applied to political protests). I address the cross-burning cases in this
section because Justice Stevens analyzes them in a manner that resonates strikingly with his
opinions in the abortion protest cases and Dale.
191. Nagel, supra note 184, at 523.
192. Id. at 528.
193. My intention in this discussion is not to conflate these very different contingents. I
group them together because of how I will contend they relate to Justice Stevens’s free
speech jurisprudence. They all advance political messages whose viewpoint could be
thought to inspire Justice Stevens’s antipathy toward their claims; as I will show, however,
he disdains all of their claims to the extent they exercise undue power over vulnerable
groups or individuals, and not out of any political animus.
194. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text (discussing NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).
195. See supra notes 139-58 and accompanying text.
196. Nagel, supra note 184, at 528.
197. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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“Conduct that creates special risks or causes special harms may be
prohibited by special rules.”198 He uses the case as an occasion for broadly
critiquing the Court’s categorical prohibition on content-based regulations
of speech. “I believe,” he insists, “our decisions establish a more complex
and subtle analysis, one that considers the content and context of the
regulated speech, and the nature and scope of the restriction on speech.”199
In light of that pragmatic approach, Justice Stevens would allow carefully
drawn restrictions on intimidating speech that poses an exceptional risk of
harm: “Threatening someone because of her race or religious beliefs may
cause particularly severe trauma or touch off a riot . . . .”200 He stresses the
practical damage that racist speech can cause, chastising the majority for
“fundamentally miscomprehend[ing] the role of race, color, creed, religion
and gender in contemporary American society.”201 Justice Stevens joins
the majority’s disposition of the case because he concludes the St. Paul
ordinance swept in too much protected speech, but he would not treat
“severe trauma” and “riot” as acceptable consequences for public discourse
of a First Amendment adjudication.202
Justice Stevens made a similar case for denying First Amendment
protection to private antipathy toward minority groups in one of the cases
for which Nagel criticizes him, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.203 In Dale,
a 5-4 decision, the Court invoked the First Amendment’s protection of
expressive association to block New Jersey from applying an
antidiscrimination statute against the Boy Scouts’ policy of excluding gay
scoutmasters.204 Nagel claims that Justice Stevens’s dissent from this
holding ignored the sort of “strong privacy interests”205 the Justice defends
in other contexts. As in the cross-burning cases, however, Justice Stevens’s
position in Dale tracks his consistent unease with using the First
Amendment to impose further disadvantages on groups traditionally
excluded from democratic discourse. His opinion establishes that the case
turns much more on the Boy Scouts’ active discrimination against gays than
on any concerted effort by the group to express antigay ideas.206 He
characterizes the Scouts’ crude exclusionary practice as creating “a
constitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority.”207 Accordingly, he
concludes, the state acted properly to stem “atavistic” prejudices that “are

198. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
199. Id. at 428.
200. Id. at 416.
201. Id. at 433 n.9 (internal quotation and brackets omitted).
202. Justice Stevens reiterates his opposition to application of a categorical First
Amendment prohibition against content-based restrictions on cross burning in his brief
concurring opinion in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 368 (2003).
203. 530 U.S. 640, 663 (2000).
204. See id. at 661.
205. Nagel, supra note 184, at 525.
206. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 678-85.
207. Id. at 696 (footnote omitted).
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still prevalent and . . . have caused serious and tangible harm to countless
members of the class New Jersey seeks to protect.”208
An assessment of Justice Stevens’s majority opinion rejecting pro-life
activists’ First Amendment claims in Hill,209 the locus of Nagel’s attack,
benefits from a look at two earlier opinions Justice Stevens wrote in
abortion protest cases. In Frisby v. Schultz,210 a 5-4 majority rejected a
facial challenge to a municipal prohibition against residential picketing,
which the town had adopted in response to a pro-life group’s vigorous
picketing of an abortion provider’s house.211 Justice Stevens dissented.
The Justice, characteristically looking past the dispute between the majority
and dissenting Justice Brennan about the proper application of the public
forum doctrine to a residential neighborhood,212 instead finds the regulation
overbroad. He agrees the ordinance properly constrained the claimants
before the Court because they “remain[ed] in front of [the doctor’s] home
and repeat[ed] [their message] over and over again simply to harm the
doctor and his family.”213 Nonetheless, he advocates applying the “strong
medicine”214 of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine because, in his
view, the ordinance completely prevented the picketers from
“communicat[ing] their strong opposition to abortion to the doctor.”215
Justice Stevens’s Frisby dissent creates a template for his future abortion
protest votes and opinions: The First Amendment should protect the
expression of a political view but should not protect assaults on vulnerable
parties.
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,216 upped the ante by presenting
a challenge to an injunction that restricted protesters’ behavior toward
pregnant women who entered health care facilities where they could obtain
abortions. The majority split on the challenge, upholding some aspects of
the injunction217 but striking down a provision that required speakers to
obtain consent before they could approach and address any person within
300 feet of a clinic.218 Justice Stevens, likening the protesters’ “sidewalk
counseling” of patients to labor picketing, states his view that the First
He defends the consent
Amendment protects both activities.219
208. Id. at 699, 700.
209. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
210. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
211. See id. at 487-88 (announcing the holding).
212. See id. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning the utility of public forum
analysis); see also supra note 158 (discussing Justice Stevens’s pragmatic antipathy toward
the public forum doctrine).
213. Id. at 498.
214. Id. at 499 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
215. Id. at 498.
216. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
217. See id. at 768-71 (upholding a thirty-six-foot “buffer zone” around a clinic entrance);
id. at 772-73 (upholding restrictions on noisy forms of protest); id. at 775-76 (upholding an
injunction’s application to protesters and those acting “in concert” with them).
218. See id. at 773-74.
219. See id. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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requirement, however, on the ground that the trial judge found “that the
injunction was necessary to protect the clinic’s patients and staff from
‘uninvited contacts, shadowing and stalking’ by petitioners.”220 He
emphasizes that such behavior poses a special danger to clinic patients,
whom the protesters caused “higher levels of ‘anxiety and hypertension’ . . .
increasing the risks associated with the procedures that the patients
seek.”221 This distinction directly anticipates Justice Stevens’s majority
opinion in Hill, which upholds a more limited statutory version of the
consent requirement struck down in Madsen.222 Once again Justice Stevens
emphasizes the distinctive danger that aggressive confrontation by hostile
protesters poses to pregnant women in need of medical care. This precise,
practical concern animates every stage of Justice Stevens’s Hill analysis,
from his assessment of the state’s regulatory interest223 to his conclusion
that the regulation is content neutral224 to his vindication of the regulation’s
prophylactic operation225 to his rejection of the claimants’ overbreadth
challenge.226
Nagel seizes on language in Justice Stevens’s Hill opinion, also present
in his partial Madsen dissent, about the importance of protecting “unwilling
audiences” from speech that disturbs them.227 Nagel assails what he
portrays as Justice Stevens’s lesser concern for unwilling listeners in the
Boy Scouts case; in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of
Stratton,228 where the Justice wrote for the Court in striking down a
municipal registration requirement for door-to-door solicitors;229 and in
City of Chicago v. Morales,230 where he wrote for a plurality in striking
220. Id.
221. Id. at 781-82.
222. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding a statutory prohibition,
operative within 100 feet of any health care facility, of approaching within eight feet of any
person without that person’s consent).
223. See id. at 715 (recognizing a state’s special interest in “avoidance of potential trauma
to patients associated with confrontational protests”).
224. See id. at 723-24 (explaining that the imperative “to protect those who enter a
healthcare facility from the harassment, the nuisance, the persistent importuning, the
following, the dogging, and the implied threat of physical touching that can accompany an
unwelcome approach,” and not the content of any speaker’s message, dictates the scope of
the regulation).
225. See id. at 729 (stating that “the statute’s prophylactic aspect is justified by the great
difficulty of protecting, say, a pregnant woman from physical harassment with legal rules
that focus exclusively on the individual impact of each instance of behavior”).
226. See id. at 731 (“What is important is that all persons entering or leaving health care
facilities share the interests served by the statute.”).
227. Nagel, supra note 184, at 513 (casting “the high valuation accorded the interests of
the ‘unwilling listener’” as “the central element in the Stevens opinion” in Hill).
228. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
229. See generally id. As to Watchtower, Nagel relies on the remarkable premise that a
knock at a homeowner’s door implicates the same privacy interests as a close-range verbal
assault on a pregnant woman. See Nagel, supra note 184, at 520 (contrasting the Watchtower
result with that in Hill and lamenting the Watchtower Court’s lack of concern for
homeowners’ “sense of vulnerability or anxiety”).
230. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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down a municipal anti-loitering ordinance.231 But the reasoning in Justice
Stevens’s abortion protest opinions makes clear that, just as one would
expect from such a thoroughgoing pragmatist, the Justice does not advocate
protecting unwilling audiences in the abstract.232 Rather, just as in R.A.V.,
Justice Stevens in Madsen and Hill emphasizes unwilling audiences’
interests only to the extent he believes the specific audiences in question
stand in a vulnerable, subordinated position relative to the First Amendment
claimants—trapped in their homes, as in R.A.V. and Frisby, or accosted
while pregnant and seeking medical care, as in Madsen and Hill.233
In refusing to employ the First Amendment to shield hate crimes,
homophobic shunning, and assaults on pregnant women, Justice Stevens
vindicates not merely regulatory interests but, more importantly, the interest
in inclusive public debate. Justice Stevens in these cases characterizes the
claimants’ behavior as nominally expressive conduct234 that threatens
democratic discourse by exploiting the social vulnerabilities of groups

231. See id. Nagel attempts to cast Justice Stevens’s lead opinion in Morales as favoring
the liberty interests of gang members over the privacy (and safety) interests of their
“unwilling audiences” and thus proving his Hill analysis disingenuous and/or politically
biased. See Nagel, supra note 184, at 517-18. Nagel’s charge finds no support in the
Morales opinion. First, the opinion unambiguously endorses the city’s interest in preventing
gang members from intimidating citizens. Morales, 527 U.S. at 51-52 (plurality opinion).
Second, Justice Stevens’s vagueness analysis, far from expressing solicitude for gang
activity, emphasizes that the ordinance’s broad language sweeps in non-gang activity and
that the ordinance fails to deter much of the most threatening gang activity. See id. at 62-63.
Finally, Justice Stevens virtually invites the city to redraft its ordinance in a constitutional
manner by adding a requirement of some overt harmful act. See id. at 51-52 (contrasting the
challenged ordinance with other Chicago regulations).
232. Justice Stevens’s allegedly undifferentiated concern for unwilling listeners leads
Nagel to write off the Justice’s majority opinion in Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), which upheld an Establishment Clause challenge to an amplified
prayer at a high school football game as merely another protection of “unwilling listeners”
against ordinary speech. See Nagel, supra note 184, at 528 n.85 (claiming that Justice
Stevens’s concern for unwilling listeners precludes him from assigning any special danger to
public prayer). In reality, however, the decision aimed to protect religious nonbelievers
against social pressure to conform to the dominant religion. An even more vague
characterization of Hill as a privacy decision inspires Nagel’s attempt to contrast Hill with
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), in which Justice Stevens wrote a narrow opinion
that overturned a finding of liability against media outlets that broadcast an illegally
intercepted conversation they had lawfully acquired. See Nagel, supra note 184, at 523
(suggesting the alleged contrast between Hill and Bartnicki “root[s] Stevens’ constitutional
discourse in some of the shabbier aspects of American culture”).
233. Justice Stevens explicitly states this distinction in Hill:
[W]hether there is a “right” to avoid unwelcome expression is not before us in this
case. The purpose of the Colorado statute is not to protect a potential listener from
hearing a particular message. It is to protect those who seek medical treatment
from the potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an unwelcome
individual delivers a message (whatever its content) by physically approaching an
individual at close range, i.e., within eight feet.
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 n.25 (2000).
234. See Stevens, supra note 33, at 1310 (“Even though the communication of intolerant
messages of hate may constitute protected ‘speech,’ some harmful conduct that intentionally
communicates the same kind of message may not be speech at all.”).
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whose experiences give rise to distinctive viewpoints.235 Expressive attacks
“used by members of a powerful group against an individual already
disadvantaged by a hostile environment,”236 just like anonymity bans,237
unfettered campaign spending,238 and legal favoritism toward the two major
political parties,239 threaten to remove important ideas from public debate.
In Justice Stevens’s view, the First Amendment should not provide the
dynamite to destroy whatever fragile bridges give socially marginal
speakers access to democratic discourse.
B. Commercial Advertising and Democratic Discourse
Arthur Hellman mounts his attack on Justice Stevens’s First Amendment
record by contrasting Justice Stevens’s free speech decisions and votes with
those of Justice Clarence Thomas. Hellman declares Justice Thomas, not
Justice Stevens, the true champion of expressive freedom because Justice
Thomas beats Justice Stevens two falls out of three: While Justice Stevens
undeniably shows greater solicitude for the First Amendment claims of
sexually oriented speech claimants, he “repeatedly takes a niggardly view
of the protection accorded by the constitutional guarantee”240 when political
advocates or commercial speakers seek its protection.241 As to political
speech, Hellman ignores the long-established insight that campaign finance
cases, to take the classic example, fairly present expressive interests on both
sides,242 which renders any simple count of pro-claimant and
antigovernment votes misleading. This Article has made a case that Justice
Stevens’s votes against First Amendment claimants in some political speech
cases advance the cause of expressive freedom.243 Even if one disputes the
understanding of the First Amendment that supports that case, no thoughtful

235. Justice Stevens’s opinions in these cases did not seek to create forums for civil
rights, gay rights, or prochoice activism. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
691-96 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (denying any effort by an opponent of the Boy
Scouts’ antigay policy to express a pro-gay message through the organization). The
expressive dimension in Justice Stevens’s analysis relates to the importance of protecting
weak and vulnerable members of society from attacks that threaten to undermine their
capacities to express their perspectives in democratic discourse.
236. Stevens, supra note 33, at 1311.
237. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)).
238. See supra notes 167-83 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 133-58 and accompanying text.
240. Hellman, supra note 185, at 418.
241. See id. at 425-29 (setting forth data on Justices’ votes in Hellman’s three categories
of free speech cases).
242. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, One Dollar-One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign
Finance Reform, 37 Washburn L.J. 1, 11 (1997) (positing campaign finance regulation as a
way “to impose direct limits on the ability of wealthy individuals to exercise undue influence
over the political process based solely on money, as opposed to the power of their ideas”).
243. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing Cal. Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)); supra notes 167-83 and accompanying text (discussing
campaign finance cases).
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assessment of Justice Stevens’s political speech opinions can accuse him of
willfully disregarding expressive freedom.244
Hellman’s criticism of Justice Stevens’s commercial speech doctrine,
although less developed, warrants closer attention.
As Hellman
acknowledges, Justice Stevens sometimes embraces commercial speech
claims.245 His record in commercial speech cases reveals two consistent
themes in support of commercial speech protection. First, he has broken
with decisions to apply the less protective commercial speech standard
where the speech at issue included significant noncommercial elements. In
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,246
the case in which the Court announced its distinctive test for assessing
commercial speech claims,247 Justice Stevens’s concurrence contends that
the speech at issue, an electric utility’s promotional advertising, deserves
full First Amendment protection.248 Subsequently, writing separately in
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,249 the Justice criticizes “the misguided
approach adopted in Central Hudson” as perpetuating “the artificiality of a
rigid commercial/noncommercial distinction.”250 Second, Justice Stevens
has deplored government attempts to justify commercial speech restrictions
by reference to the benefits of withholding information from the public. He
has repeatedly extolled “the principle that disclosure of truthful, relevant
information is more likely to make a positive contribution to
decisionmaking than is concealment of such information.”251 His persistent

244. Arthur Hellman, criticizing Justice Stevens’s account of his First Amendment views
in The Freedom of Speech, see Stevens, supra note 33, makes the puzzling claim that
“[t]here is almost nothing in the lecture that recognizes the connection between the First
Amendment and democratic theory.” Hellman, supra note 185, at 433. In fact, the bulk of
Justice Stevens’s essay explores the role and value of expressive freedom within our broader
constitutional and political system. See Stevens, supra note 33, at 1295-1308.
245. See Hellman, supra note 185, at 429 (placing Stevens “exactly in the middle” of the
Court in support for commercial speech claims).
246. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
247. See id. at 564 (articulating a variation on intermediate scrutiny as a test for
commercial speech claims under the First Amendment).
248. See id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I do not consider this to be
a ‘commercial speech’ case.”); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491
(1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that “the ‘commercial speech
doctrine’ is unsuited to this case,” which dealt with regulation that prevented brewers from
printing beer’s alcohol content on labels); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410, 420 (1993) (positing “[t]he absence of a categorical definition of the difference
between ‘newspapers’ and ‘commercial handbills’” as a reason for questioning the city’s
selective regulation of commercial newsracks).
249. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 476.
250. Id. at 493-94 (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgment).
251. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990); see
also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195 (1999) (positing
“the presumption that the speaker and the audience, not the Government, should be left to
assess the value of accurate and nonmisleading information about lawful conduct”); Rubin,
514 U.S. at 497 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that “[a]ny ‘interest’ in
restricting the flow of accurate information because of the perceived danger of that
knowledge is anathema to the First Amendment”).
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opposition to “paternalism, and informational protectionism”252 reflects
fealty to the idea that commercial speech deserves protection because of its
public information value,253 an idea integral to Justice Harry Blackmun’s
analysis in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,254 but often subordinated to autonomy arguments
in subsequent commercial speech decisions.
At the same time, Justice Stevens has advocated two important limiting
principles for commercial speech protection, both of which reflect his
pragmatic populism. First, Justice Stevens has resisted commercial speech
claims that turn merely on the advertiser’s expressive autonomy rather than
the public’s interest in information. Thus, in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott,255 the Justice wrote for the Court in upholding a mandatory joint
advertising program for fruit growers as “simply a question of economic
policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve,”256 not a speech
regulation, because the program “impose[d] no restraint on the freedom of
any producer to communicate any message to any audience.”257 In Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States,258 Justice Stevens’s
majority opinion strikes down a federal constraint on gambling
advertisements in part because “the proposed commercial messages would
convey information . . . about an activity that is the subject of intense public
debate in many communities.”259 Conversely, when commercial speech
does not implicate an issue of public concern, it presents a less compelling
claim for First Amendment protection. “Transaction-driven speech,”
Justice Stevens explains in Rubin, “usually does not touch on a subject of
public debate, and thus misleading statements in that context are unlikely to
engender the beneficial public discourse that flows from political
controversy.”260
Second, Justice Stevens has contended that the peculiar harms
commercial speech can cause consumers provide special justifications for
regulating commercial speech. One of his earliest commercial speech
opinions, anticipating his rhetoric in R.A.V.,261 warns, “The fact that a type
of communication is entitled to some constitutional protection does not
252. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 439 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-64
(1976) (positing the informational value of commercial speech as a basis for First
Amendment protection).
254. Id. at 748.
255. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
256. Id. at 468.
257. Id. at 469 (footnote omitted).
258. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
259. Id. at 184; see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (emphasizing the absence of impact on “public debate” in
defending an ordinance that singled out commercial billboards for restriction).
260. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgment).
261. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 416 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment); see supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
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require the conclusion that it is totally immune from regulation.”262 He
defines the danger to the public of “commercial harm” as “a justification for
regulation that is not present when the communication has no commercial
character.”263 A portion of his lead opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island264 that did not garner majority support proposes exercising “less than
strict review” over any commercial speech regulation that “protect[s]
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or
requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information.”265 Such
deference would dramatically expand the boundaries of permissible
commercial speech regulation beyond the Central Hudson allowance for
restrictions on untruthful or misleading advertising.266 Justice Stevens calls
this expansion necessary “to the preservation of a fair bargaining
process”267 between advertisers and consumers.
Hellman and other critics of Justice Stevens’s commercial speech
jurisprudence fail to appreciate that both aspects of the Justice’s approach—
his speech-protective tendencies and his limiting principles—arise from his
pragmatic populism. On a methodological level, Justice Stevens’s
commercial speech jurisprudence provides one of the most vivid
illustrations of his pragmatism at work. Even aside from his ever-present
attention to fact sensitivity and narrow grounds for decision,268 he ends up
on different sides of different commercial speech disputes because he
fundamentally contests the Court’s insistence on placing something it calls
“commercial speech” in a definitional and doctrinal straitjacket. On a
substantive level, all of the seemingly disparate themes that characterize
Justice Stevens’s commercial speech jurisprudence serve an overarching
262. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 716 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
263. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 81-82 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410, 426 (1993) (noting, in the course of striking down a regulation, the absence of any
“asserted . . . interest in preventing commercial harms . . . which is, of course, the typical
reason why commercial speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than
noncommercial speech” (citation omitted)). Part and parcel of Justice Stevens’s attack on
the Central Hudson standard in Rubin, see supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text, is his
charge that Central Hudson fails to place sufficient emphasis on “the reasons for permitting
broader regulation: namely, commercial speech’s potential to mislead.” Rubin, 514 U.S. at
494 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
264. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
265. Id. at 501 (plurality opinion).
266. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
267. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501.
268. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)
(applying the conventional commercial speech standard in order to avoid the need to “reach
out to make novel or unnecessarily broad pronouncements on constitutional issues”); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (emphasizing the fact
specificity of the case and the narrow grounds for the decision); Peel v. Attorney
Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1990) (explaining the analysis of
the case under the commercial speech standard as the narrower of available grounds for
decision).
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commitment to the First Amendment as a guarantor of open, robust
democratic discourse. Unlike some political speech idealists, Justice
Stevens takes seriously the idea that communication within the economic
marketplace—communication between producers and consumers—plays an
important role in public discourse. He does not want the government to
restrict commercial speech that deprives the public of information useful to
the discussion of important public issues. He does, however, accept
government limits on commercial speech that misleads consumers, makes
no contribution to public discourse, or exploits advantages in bargaining
power that advertisers enjoy over the public.
Justice Stevens configures his First Amendment analysis of commercial
speech just as he configures his analysis of Internet regulation, campaign
finance reform, and constraints on abortion clinic protesters:
by
considering how the regulation in question, and the arguments against it,
would actually affect opportunities for disparate groups, with different
degrees of social power, to debate matters that bear on the common good.
Both the underlying theory of Justice Stevens’s approach, whereby
expressive freedom should produce socially beneficial results, and its
overarching method, whereby the jurist should assess the likely results of
any conflict by reference to his or her accumulated knowledge about how
the world works, exemplify pragmatism. The conclusion the Justice
consistently reaches—that First Amendment law must serve the function of
protecting access to public discourse for speakers whose relative lack of
social power might otherwise result in their exclusion—embodies
pragmatic populism.
CONCLUSION
Justice Stevens’s pragmatic commitment to a populist jurisprudence of
expressive freedom reflects decades of thorough observation and thoughtful
reasoning. In light of Justice Holmes’s admonition that “the life of the law
has not been logic: it has been experience,”269 one might also speculate
about how Justice Stevens’s own experiences have informed his First
Amendment priorities. The Justice came of age in the milieu of Chicago
machine politics, and he gained notoriety that helped propel him to the
federal bench as general counsel to a commission assigned to probe
corruption on the Illinois Supreme Court.270 He has never thrown himself
into the sorts of partisan political activities that tend to mark the resumes of
many federal judges.271 In his own work on the Court, he appears always to
have stood at arm’s length from his most normatively committed
colleagues: Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall during the first part of
his tenure, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas during
269. Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881).
270. See generally Kenneth A. Manaster, Illinois Justice: The Scandal of 1969 and the
Rise of John Paul Stevens (2001).
271. See Sickels, supra note 1, at 34-35 (documenting Justice Stevens’s dearth of partisan
entanglements).
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his later years.272 He has been, and remains, an independent force.273 All
of this suggests that Justice Stevens’s commitment to the First Amendment
as a guarantor of inclusive, robust, even contentious democratic discourse
reflects a broader belief in the necessity of questioning and challenging
political authority.
In addition, Justice Stevens’s commitment to open discussion in the
service of wise decisions permeates his own judicial style. He has been
called “idiosyncratic, even contentious, preferring to express his own
formulations than to build consensus.”274 Justice Brennan linked Justice
Stevens’s enthusiasm for explaining his reasoning to a substantive belief in
the importance of democratic discourse. “To Justice Stevens,” Justice
Brennan wrote, “we are all part of a vast web that includes present and
future judges, practicing lawyers, academics, and the public, all engaged in
the profoundly important task of self-governance through law.”275 Justice
Stevens’s own words confirm this view. “I have always taken pride,” he
writes, “in the fact that we are the one branch of government that
conscientiously tries to explain the reasons for all of its important
decisions.”276 He views concurring and dissenting opinions in particular as
a simulacrum of democratic discourse: “Our practice of disclosing
conflicting views . . . not only gives the public an opportunity to evaluate
our work more intelligently, but also reduces the danger that troublesome
questions will be swept under the rug.”277 Justice Stevens’s steadfast
opposition to limiting in forma pauperis filings278 confirms his deep regard
for opportunities to air distinctive viewpoints.
Justice Stevens’s pragmatic populism has greatly enriched our legal
system’s understanding of, and commitment to, expressive freedom. No
other figure in American law has drawn the connection between a
pragmatic judicial methodology and a pragmatic First Amendment theory
that characterizes Justice Stevens’s free speech opinions. No other Justice
on the present Court has more energetically and effectively defended the
rights of economically and politically marginal speakers. Justice Stevens’s
pragmatism bespeaks an admirable judicial humility, a sense that appellate
272. According to Robert Sickels, writing in 1989, “Stevens’ move leftward, relative to
the other justices, seems related to what he perceives as a crude jurisprudence of results on
the right.” Id. at 145.
273. See id. at ix (noting Justice Stevens’s lack of consistent agreement or disagreement
with other Justices based on 1970s and 1980s voting records). Justice Stevens’s votes have
grown somewhat more predictable over the past decade, when his seniority has made him
the de facto leader of the Court’s “liberal wing.”
274. Id. at 159.
275. William J. Brennan, Jr., Tribute to Justice Stevens, 1992/1993 Ann. Surv. Am. L., at
xxi, xxiii.
276. John Paul Stevens, What I Did this Summer, CBA Record, Oct. 2004, at 34.
277. Id.; see also John Paul Stevens, Introduction, in Manaster, supra note 270, at xii (“If
there is disagreement within an appellate court about how a case should be resolved, I firmly
believe that the law will be best served by an open disclosure of that fact, not only to the
litigants and their lawyers, but to the public as well.”).
278. See Manaster, supra note 270, at 272.
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judges should not impose their grand visions over the more important
insights of fact finders, elected officials, and the people. His ability to draw
populism out of pragmatism provides one example of many in his life and
career of his ability to balance that humility with an ambitious sense of
purpose. Justice Stevens’s First Amendment jurisprudence tells us that
everyone should have the opportunity to elevate public discourse. Reading
his free speech opinions reminds us how that discourse should sound.

